Public Bill Committee

[Mr. Christopher Chope in the Chair]

Clause 66

Compliance with regulatory principles

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 45, in clause 66, page 32, line 6, at end add—
‘(2) Where the regulator is a local authority or authorities, prior to the provision being made the relevant authority shall consult the LBRO as to whether the authority or authorities are fully compliant with the said principles and will continue to act in accordance with those principles.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), the relevant authority may proceed to make the provision in subsection (1) with the condition that the LBRO is satisfied that any authority that is not fully compliant will become fully compliant within one year of the provision being made.’.—[Mr. Prisk.]

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Christopher Chope: I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing New clause 3—Duty to secure observance of Code of Practice—
‘Where any local authority has been granted powers under Part 3 of this Act, the LBRO shall have the duty or reviewing and, if appropriate, certifying every three years whether local authorities are compliant with the provisions of any Code issued under Section 22 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006.’.

Lorely Burt: I was mid-sentence before we broke for lunch, Mr. Chope. We were talking about new clause 3, and I was asking whether it would be helpful, when you quite rightly said, “Order, order”. I was going to ask whether it would be helpful in ensuring that local authorities comply with the Hampton principles and continue to comply with them where they have had a track record of non-compliance.

Patrick McFadden: The hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford said that I might, in responding to the debate, end up pointing him to another part of the Bill that covered some of the issues before us, and he is correct. I point him to clause 60(1)(c), which says that the relevant authority—as we have said, that will be a Minister—must consult
“such other persons as the relevant authority considers appropriate.”
I also point him to the guide to the Bill, which we have published and distributed. Page 28 says:
“For local authority regulators the Government will look to LBRO for advice on whether, in a particular regulatory field, local authorities in general are Hampton compliant.”
We have therefore drawn attention to the issue not only under the general duty on consultation elsewhere in the Bill, but in the guide, and that covers one part of what the amendment is intended to do. As the guide makes clear, a Minister who intends to award the new sanctioning powers will look to the Local Better Regulation Office for advice.
I want, however, to raise a point about the second part of the amendment. Clause 66 says that a Minister can award the powers in the Bill to regulators if he or she is satisfied that the regulator will exercise them in accordance with the principles of good regulation, which we have discussed several times. However, new subsection (3) in amendment No. 45 could give local authorities a year’s grace, in that they could use the sanctions without complying with the principles of good regulation until the end of that year.
The Government would have a problem with that because authorities that are not Hampton-compliant could be given the powers in the Bill on the basis of a projection that they might be compliant some time in the next year. There is also the question of what would happen in a year’s time if that judgment proved not to be well-founded. Authorities could have been exercising the powers for a year but might still not be Hampton-compliant. That could create a difficulty. Would the powers automatically lapse? The amendment is silent on that. That could create some uncertainty for regulators and business.
I am slightly surprised by new clause 3 because it would vastly expand LBRO’s functions. As we have discussed, LBRO will have a relatively modest budget and be relatively modest in size. The new clause would ask LBRO to review all 450 or so local authorities every three years. That would be a significant undertaking and would require a big increase in resources, but there is another reason why it goes against the grain of where we are trying to go with regulatory principles. We discussed risk-based approaches to regulation the other day, and we also know that within local authorities—but not only local authorities—there are concerns about the amount of routine, tick-box audit and inspection. A requirement that is not risk-based but includes all local authorities, every three years, would be pulling in a different direction from where we are going more generally with audit and inspection policy.
Clause 67 requires the Minister who makes the order that gives local authorities and other regulators access to the new powers to undertake a one-off, post-implementation review three years after it comes into effect. That is sensible. A measure that made that happen to every local authority every three years would be going too far. For those reasons, we do not want to accept new clause 3.
On the review mechanism in the Bill, the Minister would have to consult such persons as he considers appropriate. When local authorities have been given the powers, the Minister would be expected to consult LBRO. There is also an issue with a different requirement on the compliance code from elsewhere in the Bill. Local authorities will have to “have regard to” the compliance code when carrying out their enforcement activity, including the use of part 3 powers. However, new clause 3 would mean that
“local authorities are compliant with the provisions of any Code”.
We spoke about conflicting requirements on local authorities when we spoke to a previous amendment. “Have regard to” is the amendment that is set down on the compliance code. There are a few grounds on which I hope new clause 3 and amendment No. 45 are not pressed to a Division.
I accept that the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford is trying to keep those things under review, but the proposals might be only a blunt instrument in that regard and, as I said, they would pull us away from the more risk-based approach that we are pursuing.

Mark Prisk: It has been a useful debate. Amendment No. 45 was not entirely dealt with in the Minister’s response. He said that part of the guidance that comes with the Bill talks about compliance in general. However, we are not concerned with the general but specifically with the local authority and whether it is truly compliant with the principles on which the Bill is based. I am therefore not entirely convinced by what the Minister said.
I recognise and accept that amendment No. 45 would be unduly burdensome as a regulatory cost. I shall come back to that in a moment.
On new clause 3, when we go back to the Macrory principles—I was reading them again yesterday to clarify them in my own mind—we will see that there is a good argument for saying that if we are going to have an established set of principles on how regulators operate, it is important to ensure that they operate on a consistent basis and not just on a snapshot. There is an entirely legitimate argument that the new clause would give the LBRO a significant and increased function to perform, but that does not outweigh the importance of ensuring that the local regulatory bodies are consistently compliant, and that they therefore fit with what Macrory says. After all, we are talking about a three-year period, and as we know, local authorities vary in their performance over a year, let alone three. We are simply seeking to ensure that the LBRO has the ability to investigate. How it seeks to do so—perhaps by a detailed inspection—is not specified; rather, it would give the LBRO the opportunity to ensure that authorities are consistently compliant.

Patrick McFadden: May I clarify something that the hon. Gentleman said? We are not talking about specific local authorities, but the capacity of local authorities in general to exercise powers in a regulatory field. We do not want some local authorities to be able to exercise them, and others not. I hope that he takes the point about the difference between local authorities exercising the powers in a regulatory field—for example, trading standards—and individual councils in different parts of the country.

Mark Prisk: That is entirely reasonable. I think that the Minister has highlighted the Government’s intentions. At the beginning of the debate, I said that I wanted to deal with the amendment and new clause 3 separately. If acceptable, I shall withdraw the amendment and, at the appropriate moment, press the new clause to a Division. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill

Clause 67

Review

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mark Prisk: I welcome the clause. The Minister referred to the fact that after three years there will be a review, which my party, in another place, was able to establish as a very important part of what will be a new regulatory environment. It is important to put that on the record. In particular, it is worth the Committee noting that there is not only a three-year review period, but a requirement to publish the outcome and lay it before the House. We welcome those important aspects of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 67 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 68

Suspension

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Patrick McFadden: The clause provides that where a Minister has made an order conferring sanctioning powers on a regulator, they may direct it not to impose further sanctions. Subsection (2) provides that the Minister may take such action only if there is evidence that the regulator has failed
“on more than one occasion”—
an important point—to comply with a duty imposed on it. We are not trying to set up a new regulatory regime, as the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford just said in relation to the previous clause, that could simply be withdrawn if there is a failure on just one occasion. There is a tone of persistence about the suspension clause that I want to impress on the Committee.
The clause provides, therefore, that such a direction could be made only where there is evidence that the regulator has failed more than once to comply with a duty imposed on it under part 3 of the Bill, or to act in accordance with its penalty guidance, enforcement policy or relevant principles of regulatory best practice. Subsection (3) provides that a Minister may revoke a direction suspending a regulator’s sanctioning powers
“if satisfied that the regulator has taken the appropriate steps to remedy the failure”.
Furthermore, the clause ensures transparency, and subsection (4) requires the Minister to consult before making a direction to suspend the powers or revoke such a direction. As the hon. Gentleman said earlier, the Bill allows regulators access to a range of important new powers. We talked this morning about stop notices, which could be particularly significant. Businesses and others subject to the powers in the Bill need assurances that regulators will use the sanctioning powers responsibly and consistently. The clause contains safeguards, therefore, by providing for a power to suspend their use, if that is not the case.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69

Payment of penalties into Consolidated Fund etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Patrick McFadden: The clause is about the payment of penalties. Again, we touch on previous debates; we have often mentioned the analogy of parking, imperfect though it is. The accusation is sometimes made that parking fines are used as a revenue-raising mechanism. The clause makes it clear that money received through the issue of a fixed or variable penalty, including late payments or interest charges, must be paid into the relevant Consolidated Fund. Subsection (2) defines those funds.
Professor Macrory recommended that there should be no perverse financial incentive for regulators to favour a particular sanction. In our discussions about the various new powers available to regulators under the Bill, I have said several times that we are trying to avoid perverse incentives to use one route rather than another. The payment of penalties into the Consolidated Fund is important. The clause ensures that and acts as a safeguard against the kind of incentives that we want to avoid.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 69 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 70

Disclosure of information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mark Prisk: I wonder whether I might test the Minister. I allude to a debate initiated by the hon. Member for Stafford. How confident is the Minister that the clause is secure from legal challenge? I think not only of the Data Protection Act 1998 or the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 but of human rights legislation. I know that Ministers always have to sign such things off, and it would be helpful to know how confident he is about that.
Would he also tell us how confident the public can be that the disclosure of information by the criminal justice system to the regulators enabled under the clause will at all times be appropriate, confidential and secure? We are all aware of recent mishaps with various forms of data—I am sure that the Minister has his laptop firmly attached, unlike a Cabinet Minister recently. The loss of 25 million benefit records and the dreadful and unfortunate errors with other data concern people, so it is important that the public can be confident that these matters will be handled in an appropriate and confidential way.

Patrick McFadden: This is a gateway clause that allows the passing of information from the criminal justice system to regulators. It is necessary because those who work in the criminal justice system may come across breaches that are properly dealt with by the kind of civil penalties provided for under the Bill. The clause allows them to pass information about those breaches or potential breaches to the relevant regulator. Such gateway clauses are not unprecedented. For example, the Enterprise Act 2002 has a similar provision. When making an order under part 3, the Minister concerned will assess the situation to ensure, as far as is possible in the circumstances, that it is compliant with the European convention on human rights.
If it helps the Committee, I have some more facts about the clause. Information may be disclosed only if the regulator has an enforcement function in relation to a criminal offence, and for the purposes of the regulator exercising one of the new powers. Subsection (2) provides that the information that can be disclosed could include information collected before this provision comes into force. Subsection (3) provides that disclosure of information is
“not to be taken to breach any restriction of information”.
However, subsection (4) does not authorise the sharing of information in contravention of the Data Protection Act 1998 or part 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The hon. Gentleman is right to say that one must be careful with any clause that mentions information sharing and the public have legitimate concerns in that area.
Equally, it is also in the public’s interest for breaches of the law in the regulatory field to be properly investigated. If we relate the clause to the wider purpose of the Bill and part 3 in particular, that purpose is to give regulators a new suite of powers in order to regulate more effectively than they can at present with the one-club option of criminal prosecution. It seems correct to allow for the passing of information from the people concerned with one route, the criminal justice system, to those who, by virtue of the Bill, will be responsible for enforcing the new civil penalties. Information powers should always be treated with care, but clause 70 gives the regulatory system an advantage in ensuring that where there are breaches, the information goes to those who are responsible for enforcing the law and gives them the information necessary to do so.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 70 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 72

Duty not to impose or maintain unnecessary burdens

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Patrick McFadden: The clause brings us to part 4 of the Bill. To use a lay term, I would summarise part 4 by saying that it is related to an aspect of the job description of regulators. This part of the Bill was significantly improved as a result of discussion and amendment in the other place and it gives us two important clauses, beginning with clause 72. I am sure that we would all agree that part of the job description of regulators—not the whole of it—should be, as the clause states, that they exercise their functions in a manner that does not impose unnecessary burdens or maintain burdens that the regulator considers to have become unnecessary. The point about the regulator making the judgment is one of the changes that have been made as we have moved along the line in debating the clause.
In overview, the clause is about helping to ensure that regulators do not impose or maintain unnecessary burdens. Subsection (2) provides that where the duty has been imposed, unnecessary burdens need not be removed where it would be impracticable or disproportionate to do so. The sense of proportion is important because it is something that has been added. We could find a situation where a burden had been identified by a regulator as being unnecessary but the act of removing it would be completely disproportionate to the burden that it was placing on the regulated bodies. Subsection (2) allows that question of proportion to be taken into account.
In following this duty, the Government do not intend that regulators should divert resources from their core functions in a way that compromises their effectiveness. As I said, this is part of the job description of regulators; it is not in any sense the whole job description. In considering unnecessary burdens, we expect that regulators should be able to target their resources more effectively, therefore enhancing regulatory outcomes. Subsections (3) to (6) require a regulator to whom the duty has been applied to publish a statement as soon as is reasonably practicable, setting out what they propose to do in the following 12 months. Statements must then be published annually, so the clause asks regulators to keep a constant eye on the question of unnecessary burdens. That is important because in the regulatory field we often talk about the need for a culture change, and the provision whereby the issue will be considered annually is intended to embed that approach.

Mark Prisk: In the light of the duty and the knowledge that the Government intend to establish regulatory budgets, how does the Minister see the two policies interweaving? I can see a connection, but it would be helpful to understand how that will work. There is a new duty not to have unnecessary burdens, and he has just spoken about wanting to encourage regulators to use their resources appropriately. How does that fit into a regulatory budget environment?

Patrick McFadden: The hon. Gentleman is right to suggest that regulatory budgets are much discussed and have significant potential in this field. They will focus people’s minds not only on what is coming in, but on what could be taken out. I think that that would help in a regulatory budget environment, because there would be a duty on regulators constantly to have an eye on the stock, as it were, as well as the flow. I do not see a contradiction between the two elements; in fact, I think that they go well together.
The power is an important addition to the suite of provisions that are designed to embed this agenda within the group of regulators operating in this country. I stress that it is not new or unheard of; it is similar to the duty in the Communications Act 2003 that requires Ofcom to keep its functions under review, with a view to ensuring that unnecessary burdens are not imposed or maintained.
The clause also provides an avenue for implementing the recommendation by the House of Lords Select Committee on Regulators in its recent report, “UK Economic Regulators”, that
“economic regulators be statutorily required to facilitate the competitiveness of UK firms by...removing regulatory burdens from firms wherever possible.”
The clause is in line with that recommendation.

Mark Prisk: I welcome the Minister’s remarks. Indeed, I welcome what is in effect a new duty to keep the regulatory function under review and for regulators of the various hues that we have been considering under this legislation not to impose an unnecessary regulatory burden. It is fair to say that the clause has changed quite remarkably from the original drafts that I saw in early forms of the Bill that were considered in the other place. I commend the other place for the work that it did.
I also welcome the recognition of the need to remove such burdens, which is noted in subsection (2). However, I note that the regulator, whoever that may be in any circumstance, will still be left to decide, first, what is or is not, in their view, burdensome, and secondly, whether its removal would be impracticable or disproportionate. The requirement to publish an explanatory statement is fine in itself, but I am disappointed that notably lacking is a clear statement, a requirement—I did not hear this in the Minister’s remarks—for direct consultation and/or involvement of business in determining whether a regulatory burden is unnecessary.
This is a missed opportunity, if I may say so. I hope that the Minister will correct that in replying to the debate. I suspect that to rely on regulators regulating themselves is not likely to deliver the significant change that we would all like in this area. Understandably, given the general circumstances politically, Ministers are talking a great deal about wanting to listen to business and to reduce the regulatory burden—heaven knows, with the state of the economy, that is long overdue—yet they have missed this opportunity to do so. Often it is the regulated, not the regulator, who is best able to judge what is an unnecessary or disproportionate burden. The Minister will probably retort that, by using the Hampton principles, here embedded in the Bill, the regulators will be able to make that assessment. However, to fail to enable business to affect the decisions is a serious omission.
I am particularly concerned for small businesses. Both sides of the House agree that regulations have a disproportionate impact on the smallest businesses. The Federation of Small Businesses tells us that the average small business spends seven hours a week complying with Government red tape and regulation. Given that there are 4.4 million small businesses in the UK, that is an extraordinary waste of what could be highly productive time.

Judy Mallaber: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that if we consult businesses, which is what I think he is suggesting, we have to be careful that the business does not put forward as unnecessary regulation something that is a regulation for a good purpose? Something that may seem a burden on a business could have a proper protective or administrative purpose. I have difficulty seeing why we should just leave it to that business. We must also be careful that we do not start to put too much burden of regulation on the regulator, otherwise we will find ourselves with mirrors on mirrors—potentially more administrative burdens.

Mark Prisk: I understand the hon. Lady’s point. She is right that it would not be appropriate for the regulated to decide what regulations there should be. My concern is that the regulated, rather than the regulator, should be able to be involved—indeed, expressly—in looking at where the problems are. They should be able to say, “We are having a real problem with this particular regulation.” It should be expressly stated. That, I think, is the omission.
The hon. Lady is right that the decision must inevitably rest with the regulator. My concern is about the omission of an explicit mechanism or trigger to ensure that business understands that it has a part to play in an important duty being put forward by the Government. Perhaps such a provision will be set out in response to the debate, in the statements that the Minister may be writing as we speak. Can he tell us what consideration he and his officials have given to the inclusion in the clause of a provision that the regulators should respond to business concerns about regulation? What considerations have they made? Has the Minister held any meetings with the business community, to discuss the clause and how business might aid the process of rooting out unnecessary burdens?
Members of the Committee will be familiar—I know you are, Mr. Chope—with the British Chambers of Commerce burdens barometer. We could debate the strengths and weaknesses of any methodology of judging, but the British Chambers of Commerce is well placed to do so.

Judy Mallaber: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that many people think that the business barometer is absolute nonsense and makes no sense whatever? That view was expressed to the Regulatory Reform Committee, of which I am a member, by many organisations. The barometer is not a tool that has a great deal of respect.

Mark Prisk: I am sure that is the hon. Lady’s view, but I suspect that it is not the view of the British Chambers of Commerce. It is not my view. It is important that we have a clear, itemised list of what the burden of regulation is. The barometer has shown that the burden of regulation has increased by £65 billion over the past 11 years— £10 billion in the past 12 months—so there is clearly a problem. We can argue over one item or another, but the principle is the same.
To conclude, why does the clause not reflect the clear interest and concerns of business? Why is there no guidance from the Minister to show that business can participate, and is welcome to do so, in trying to identify unnecessary burdens of regulation? I hope that his response will lift the cloud of uncertainty and demonstrate that business has a part to play. I look forward with eager anticipation to his remarks.

Lorely Burt: I find part 4 somewhat confusing. It was not originally part of the Bill, and seems to have been tagged on at the end without any consultation—indeed, after the consultation period. I wonder if that is reflected in some of the potential for duplication we have seen. Although I accept that it is vital that not one unnecessary burden is imposed on business, I am almost tempted to wonder why this part is necessary. What is it saying that is not implied or embedded elsewhere in the Bill? Is the duty not to impose unnecessary regulatory burdens so good and so important that—a bit like “New York, New York”—it has to be said twice?
In relation to the comments of the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford about mechanisms and how the system would work, other than what exists, what would this part of the Bill impose on LBROs or others to fulfil the requirement not to impose unnecessary regulatory burdens? The Government have set the target of a 25 per cent. reduction in unnecessary burdens by 2012, but they have achieved only 6 per cent. so far, so I am sure that additional help would be extremely welcome. However, what do these provisions bring to the Bill?

Patrick McFadden: The hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford asked about a few matters on which I hope to give him some satisfaction. He asked about business input into the level of burdens or whether burdens can be removed. As the hon. Member for Solihull said, the Government have a specific target to meet.
I shall come to the burdens barometer of the British Chambers of Commerce in a moment, but to rewind on the Government’s position, several years ago, we set about the task of measuring the administrative burden on UK business and setting a target to reduce it. The job description for regulators has become part of the job description for Whitehall Departments. Each year, simplification plans are produced. The hon. Lady referred to them and I confirm that so far we are on track to meet them, although I cannot predict the future with certainty—no one can. However, the plans involve a serious exercise that has focused minds in Whitehall. We talked a moment ago about regulatory budgets. The duty is not a regulatory budget, but it is related in the sense that it asks Departments to think about the overall impact of what they do and the stock that is focused on, and to find ways of simplifying and easing matters for business.
The hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford asked about business input. I refer him and other hon. Members to the website, www.betterregulation.gov.uk. If he or a business feel that a particular regulation has become outdated or unnecessary, they can ask for it to be looked at to see if it can be removed. That action would not be giving the business a promise that the regulation would disappear like a puff of smoke, but it would force the Department to consider the matter. There is certainly capacity in the overall regulatory set-up for business voices to be heard.

Mark Prisk: There may indeed be existing channels, but there is no requirement related to the clause by which the regulators shall specifically talk to or involve the business community. Can the Minister confirm that?

Patrick McFadden: At the end, the clause confirms that the regulator will carry out that judgment. We have covered a couple of times in our debates on the Bill the matter of whether it can be entirely down to the regulated to make that judgment. I am sure that, as part of the annual process that we are setting out in the clause, any sensible regulator will discuss the regulatory burdens with those on whom those burdens are imposed. If a business feels that a regulator is interpreting policies in a way that imposes unnecessary burdens, it is entitled to raise the matter with the regulator. An annual review will help to promote that kind of dialogue between regulators and business. However, I do not see a need to write that into the legislation: I think the review will result in that.
However, I want to take the hon. Gentleman up on the British Chambers of Commerce survey, which has been cited a lot in our debates. We have not had too much party divide during our deliberations on the Bill, but the Government would see some of the things that have been cited as burdens in the BCC list not as burdens but as marks of a civilised society and an economy with proper rules. Instances in the list refer to disabled access to public transport, but I do not see that as a burden on business.

Judy Mallaber: Does my hon. Friend agree that the problem with the barometer is that it mixes up a burden with a legitimate policy objective that can be discussed and argued about? It does not confine itself to genuinely administrative areas, such as when one of the objectives is not being implemented in the most sensible way to avoid a burden on business. For example, an objective could require someone to fill out three forms, when one or none would do. That is what the barometer should be identifying, as is the case with a number of the European countries that the Regulatory Reform Committee visited within the last couple of weeks.

Patrick McFadden: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There is a completely legitimate discussion to be had, and a legitimate case to be made, about the administrative burdens of the total sum of regulation. However, given the way that the Government have set up their review, that would be a separate discussion from policy outcomes. My hon. Friend’s description of the BCC list is absolutely right, because it mixes up the two things. We can probably all have an argument about one person’s burden being another person’s legitimate policy outcome, but in my view that is the weakness in the BCC list.
What do we mean when we talk about unnecessary burdens? They are burdens that are disproportionate to the regulator’s policy objective; in other words, they go further than is necessary to achieve the objective. They are targeted at situations where action is not required to achieve that objective, or are imposed in circumstances in which it would be possible to achieve the outcome in a less burdensome way.
We are not trying to set up a duty that interferes with the operational independence of the regulators; we are talking about the way in which they carry out those functions. That is why part 4 is a useful part of the Bill. 
Mr. Priskrose—

Patrick McFadden: I was about to sit down, but I am happy to give way.

Mark Prisk: I shall intervene only briefly, and I will not stretch your patience, Mr. Chope, with an in-depth exposition of the British Chambers of Commerce barometer, except to say—in response to the Minister’s comment—that where a cost is incurred on, for example, the pay roll of a business, it is legitimate for that to be noted as a cost, however legitimate the policy may be.
My question to the Minister goes to the heart of the debate. If it is not explicit in the clause, will he join me in urging business that where they identify unnecessary burdens, with this new duty in place, they should make their concerns directly known to the regulators involved, so that there can be a genuine partnership in the process? Does he share that view? Will he join me in making that encouragement to the business community?

Patrick McFadden: Let me put it in my own way. First, there are existing avenues, as I have discussed, as well as a serious Government process to reduce administrative burdens, in which business has a completely legitimate voice. Secondly, the duty in clause 72 for an annual review of unnecessary burdens will entail regulators discussing those burdens with business.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 72 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 73

Functions to which section 72 applies

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Patrick McFadden: If clause 72 is about regulators’ job description, clause 73 is about their functions and the particular regulators to which the duty will apply. It has been said by some that a ministerial order made under powers conferred in clause 73 could interfere with regulators’ independence. As I just said, this is not about regulators’ independence; it is about how their functions are carried out. Some regulators requested that they be named in the Bill. They are named in subsection (2), paragraphs (a) to (e): the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, the Office of Fair Trading, the Office of Rail Regulation, the Postal Services Commission and the Water Services Regulation Authority. Subsection (2) applies the duty to those regulators.
We have included the power in the Bill rather than simply applying the duty to all regulators to allow flexibility in both the extent and the timing of the duty’s applications. The power to apply the duty in a territorial sense is set out in subsections (3), (4) and (5). Subsection (6) requires the Minister to consult the regulator and other appropriate bodies before seeking to apply the duty, subsection (7) allows the order to make consequential amendments and subsections (8) to (11) specify other procedural requirements. The Committee might want to note that an order applying the duty is subject to the affirmative procedure. The clause concerns the functions that we have discussed, which are set out in subsection (1), and the regulators to whom the new duty will apply.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 73 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 74 to 76 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 77

Short title

Patrick McFadden: I beg to move amendment No. 48, in clause 77, page 37, line 30, leave out subsection (2).
The amendment will remove the privilege amendment made in another place. It is a technical change, but an important one. As hon. Members are aware, the financial powers of the other place are restricted by the rights and privileges of the House and by the Parliament Acts. As the Bill originated in the other place and contains financial powers, a privilege amendment was added to it before its introduction in this House to ensure that the House’s financial privileges were not infringed.
This technical amendment is therefore necessary to remove the privilege amendment, which provided that nothing in the Bill should impose or vary any charge on the people or public funds. It is as much about parliamentary rules as it is about the Bill itself, but it is nevertheless necessary.

Mark Prisk: Let no one say that we do not learn something in these Committees—I confess to a possible moment of excitement when we saw a Government amendment suddenly lurch forward at the last minute. We were on clause 48 and on Tuesday my office went into full excitement mode—even more than usual—but, lo and behold, it is a technical amendment and does not afford us the opportunity to scrutinise the Minister at great length. It is entirely sensible and so, with a slight hint of disappointment, I will not oppose it.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 77, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 2

Limitation
‘This Act and any order made under it shall by virtue of this section cease to have effect on 1st January 2014.’.—[Mr. Prisk.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mark Prisk: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Having concluded the clauses, we come to the new clauses. New clause 2 is very important because, as you will have seen, Mr. Chope, it is a sunset clause. As we have discussed, the scope of the Bill is quite significant—technical, yes, but significant none the less. It creates an entirely new local regulatory system and an entirely new non-departmental public body, albeit there is a company in shadow at present. It provides extensive powers of sanction and enforcement, involving not one single regulator but 27; and not one piece of legislation but over 140 different laws. The Bill permits the Secretary of State to make, by order, important changes to both the current and the proposed system of local regulation. That means, I hope, that in all local authority areas we, as Members of this House, will see the potential for improvement in the regulatory environment. However, those changes will affect all our constituents.
In the other place, my noble Friends were able to secure some important concessions, not least that of a three-year review under clause 17 that covers only the LBRO. Given that the LBRO is not, as we have debated, directly accountable to this House, it was right to seek that review. However, clause 17 and the review contained therein does not apply to the whole Bill and that is why it is important to insert the means to debate whether this legislation should persist after a five-year period.
New clause 2 offers a number of important advantages to us as a House. It enables us to assess the whole Act and look at how it has worked in practice. The Minister has understandably looked at the different parts of the Bill in detailed consideration during our deliberations today. However, we can all see that the sanctions regime, the operation of primary authorities and the LBRO’s new and interesting range of powers will not only work in themselves, but will work together. It is difficult to know what the end result will be—it is untried and untested and we cannot be certain about it. The LBRO is not a long-established, familiar organisation that we can judge on its performance, powers and role.
The new clause would allow us to look in particular at the range of sanctions and their impact, especially on small businesses. It would help to focus—this is an important benefit, which the Minister referred to earlier—all the regulators’ minds on their performance not only in the coming year but over the next five years. They would know that we reserve and have the power to scrutinise the legislation in full. The insertion of a sunset clause is not a cheap excuse for getting rid of a piece of legislation without due thought. It would enable the House to ensure that the law of the land is working. The legislation provides significant changes for our constituents.
Rightly, the Government have said that they want to get serious about regulation and reducing the regulatory burden, which I welcome. The new clause provides an opportunity for them to turn that promise into practice.

Lorely Burt: I welcome the prospect of a sunset clause. Earlier in the proceedings, I got a bit excited when I interpreted the three-year review of the LBRO as a sunset clause. On new clause 3, I would suggest that six and a half years is too long a period, but I would welcome a sunset clause proposal. Based on costs of £4.5 million per annum, we would have spent £29 million before the clause would be invoked. That is too much and too long a prospect. A three-year sunset clause would be extremely welcome, and I would also welcome the Minister’s views on how we might go about imposing such a clause not only on this Bill, but on other Government Bills.

Patrick McFadden: Let me begin by saying that sunset clauses are perfectly legitimate issues to raise. They are not always inappropriate by any means, and they have been added to a number of Bills, so, on a basic level, it is legitimate to consider them. However, in relation to a Bill such as this, such a clause is unwise, and I shall set out my reasons for so thinking.
The Bill intends to change the regulatory environment to deal with two significant problems, as we have said. The first problem is an inconsistency in the manner in which regulations are applied around the country, which is essentially dealt with in parts 1 and 2. The second problem is the inflexibility in the penalty regime, which is dealt with in part 3.
Business appreciates clarity and certainty, and the Bill intends to give those things. I fear that the insertion of a sunset clause such as new clause 2 would do precisely the opposite. Businesses and other regulated organisations need confidence and certainty when making decisions that the regime that is being implemented will be there for some time. To begin from the premise that the Bill will lapse in the period set out in the clause would damage the Bill, not only at the end of the period, but through its period of operation.
For example, uncertainty about the continued existence of LBRO would make it difficult for it to carry authority and trust. Businesses would think twice about entering into primary authority relationships. We have debated how important those are in ensuring consistency and clarity for businesses a lot in the past few days. If businesses thought that the legal basis for the relationship would be abolished after five years, they would think twice about investing time, and indeed money, in them—there is a cost recovery provision. Would they know that the advice that they had received would hold good in future? That could be a problem. Local authorities would also have a reduced incentive to comply with the guidance of a body that Parliament has said has a time-limited life.
On part 3, for example, when we think about the penalties that we have discussed in some depth, as we approached the sunset point regulators might stop issuing sanctions because their capacity to do so was coming to an end, and they would rely again on the one-club policy of criminal prosecution that the Bill tries to get away from. Regulators would have little incentive to take up these powers, in the knowledge that they would be withdrawn after a period of time.
A review clause is different. It states that we will look at how the system is operating, but it does not say that it will come to an end, as a sunset clause does. Regulators adopting the powers in 2010 would find themselves in the position of having to submit to a review clause after three years, an exercise with doubtful effects in view of the fact that if the new clause became part of the Bill, Parliament would have legislated for the whole regime to go out of existence two years later anyway. For a number of reasons, that is unwise.
A similar clause was debated in the other place too. I am not against review; it is a perfectly sensible thing to do and it is built into the Bill, but that is different from the automatic ending entailed in a sunset clause.
We have had a lot of representations on this issue. If I may detain the Committee with a few of the quotes on the issue, it may give an idea of the strength of feeling about consistency and clarity. The Federation of Small Businesses said:
“The FSB...has invested a great deal of time and effort in pushing for the establishment of the LBRO. It would be sad to see a sunset clause applied to the LBRO as this would severely impact on its ability to function in the interest of 4.5 million small businesses.”
Going from small business to a larger national chain, Boots said,
“the LBRO benefits of the Bill will be lost with the result that industry will be left still dealing with the inconsistencies that Government promised would be addressed by this new approach to regulatory coordination.”
Sainsbury’s said:
“The introduction of the sunset clause will, we believe, make the role of the LBRO more difficult and potentially prejudice its ability to bring about the change which is required.”
There are other comments here and I could go on, but I shall not quote all of them. Finally, the CBI said:
“Sunset clauses in principle are a good tool to ensure that regulations are fit for purpose and deliver their objectives. But we feel that the specific addition of a sunset clause would not materially add value in the case of the RES Bill... such an amendment could reduce the LBRO’s ability to implement its goal of improving the quality of local authority enforcement.”
So I think we can see a broad opposition to the new clause, both among organisations representing small business and some well-known big businesses. For those reasons, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not press the new clause.

Mark Prisk: I am interested to hear some of the quotations. There are other quotations from other similar organisations, not specifically on the sunset clause, but on the measures that the Bill represents. The CBI says that the Bill represents for business a “leap of faith”. We need to be careful, therefore, about how we selectively quote what different organisations think.

Patrick McFadden: Would the hon. Gentleman accept that the quotes that I read out are specifically related to the sunset clause, and the quote that he has read out is not?

Mark Prisk: Absolutely. Equally, in the end we have to decide whether what we do in this House is right. I am always happy to listen to the business audience and ensure that their concerns are accurately represented, as I have done in the past two days, but in the end we must make sure that this House reserves its right to consider these matters without due prejudice. I want to ensure that we do that properly.
The point about a sunset clause is not the presumption that we will remove the Bill; it is to provide a point when it can be replaced, removed or renewed. I suspect that the good elements, which businesses clearly wish to see maintained, would be renewed. A sunset clause is not final: it may be the end for the Bill, but it may not. It allows Parliament to consider whether what is on the statute book is working.
I accept that it is difficult to strike the right balance, and have said on a number of occasions that parts of the Bill have considerable merit. I welcome many of them, but I am sceptical whether others will achieve what the Government hope. I suspect that we share the hope for a better regulatory environment, but should the regime be permanent or, after reviewing particular elements of the Bill—but not all, because we do not have that opportunity—should we have the option of annulling it on 1 January 2014, which after all is some distance off?
With respect to the organisations that the Minister mentioned—I know them well—I do not buy the argument that the fact that there might be a review in Parliament of the Bill means that no one will make a deal or memorandum of understanding with a primary authority for the next six years. Neither do I buy the Minister’s argument that the LBRO will struggle to survive or fulfil its functions, if on 1 January 2014 Parliament has the opportunity to reconsider how the legislation is operating. I fully accept that we will want to consider that carefully, and it might well be that a future Government at that point would wish to enhance, or even improve, this legislation. I suspect that that would be well within the reach of future Governments upon consideration. At the moment, the House will have no means of considering it after Third Reading. That will be the end of the matter. There will be a review—that is fine—but only on specific elements and orders. That is why this new clause is so important. I am not convinced by his comments, so I wish to press the new clause to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 8.

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 3

Duty to secure observance of Code of Practice
‘Where any local authority has been granted powers under Part 3 of this Act, the LBRO shall have the duty or reviewing and, if appropriate, certifying every three years whether local authorities are compliant with the provisions of any Code issued under Section 22 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006.’.—[Mr. Prisk.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Motion made, and Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

Lorely Burt: On a point of order, Mr. Chope. I seek your guidance before we proceed. I was somewhat surprised to see new clauses 4 and 5 on today’s selection list. They were not originally chosen, but were both intended to be included with my amendments Nos. 58, 59 and 60, which would have replaced clauses 28, 29 and 30. I am ready, willing and able to go ahead with this discussion, but in view of the fact that we have already discussed clauses 28, 29 and 30, I ask your guidance. Do you consider this to be an appropriate time to discuss the new clauses, or do you feel that we should leave it to a subsequent stage of the Bill?

Christopher Chope: I am in the hon. Lady’s hands. The new clauses are hers, so she can decide not to move them if she wants. The reason why they were not on the selection list for debate on the last occasion was that they were effectively starred. They were ruled out because sufficient notice of them had not been given before the Committee met. Now they are in order and in time. If she wants to discuss them, we can propose them and deal with them accordingly after she moves them. If she does not want to move them, that is her decision. I hope that that is helpful.

Lorely Burt: I am grateful for your guidance, Mr. Chope. I would therefore like to introduce the new clauses and explain why I wanted them included.

Christopher Chope: Order. The hon. Lady must realise that new clauses are separate items. One cannot discuss them together. They are not grouped for debate, so they must be discussed seriatim.

Lorely Burt: I apologise if I was misleading in describing them.

New Clause 4

Enforcement action
‘(1) A local authority other than the primary authority (‘an enforcing authority’) must inform the primary authority of any breaches of legislation of which it becomes aware.
(2) An enforcing authority wishing to take any enforcement action through the courts against the regulated person must seek a statement from the primary authority.
(3) Any statement issued under subsection (2) shall include—
(a) Such information on the history of the relationship between the primary authority and the regulated person as the primary authority feels is relevant to the case; and
(b) any specific written advice that has been issued by the primary authority on the matter in question.
(4) Any statement issued under subsection (2) must be disclosed to the regulated person.’.—[Lorely Burt.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Lorely Burt: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 4 would remove primary authorities’ blanket power to prevent local authorities from taking enforcement action in their own area, while ensuring that the courts have the evidence that they need to treat business fairly and that primary authorities have intelligence on regulatory issues affecting the businesses that they work with.
Clause 28, which we have discussed, bestows on one local authority the power of veto over another local authority’s enforcement decisions. Not only is that undemocratic, but it gives the primary authority de facto powers of legal interpretation, which are the proper function of the courts. New clause 4 proposes to remove that veto and leave it to the courts, rather than the primary authority, to decide whether enforcement action is unjustified in the light of advice given to a company by the primary authority. It would protect the Bill’s intention to promote consistency and deter unjustified enforcement action without the attendant objectionable transfers of power involved in clause 28. Subsection (1) of the proposed new clause would improve the primary authority’s ability to focus its work on the area of greatest need by ensuring that it has the fullest possible picture of the company’s health and safety performance.

Patrick McFadden: I ask colleagues to oppose the new clause if it is pressed to a vote. The Bill is about tackling inconsistency in local regulatory enforcement. I fear that passing the new clause would change fundamentally the balance of authority between the enforcing authority and the primary authority, therefore militating against the removal of that inconsistency, which is a central premise of the Bill. As the hon. Lady said, we are in the slightly odd position, technically, of discussing a new clause that, if passed now, would leave us with two parallel regimes. On Tuesday we discussed the primary authority scheme fully. However, I will leave that aside and deal with the new clause on its merits.
The new clause seeks to table an alternative approach to the primary authority partnership, whereby the enforcing authority would simply have to inform the primary authority if it was going to act, without the primary authority being able to take a view on that, as set out in the Bill. I understand that the original intention was to protect local authorities’ discretion to pursue any enforcement action that they choose by replacing the primary authority principle with an information-sharing provision. As I said, that is a very different relationship and, from the point of view of the regulated, would introduce much more uncertainty into the system. It would pose a serious question mark over why they should go to the trouble of constructing a primary authority relationship if the primary authority had no say over how the local enforcement authority was going about matters.
Businesses have asked us to provide access to a scheme that will provide them with more dependable advice and much quicker resolution of disputes between authorities, giving them the certainty and clarity that they seek. The Government start from the principle, enshrined in the Bill, that where a business and a local authority have gone to the trouble of establishing that primary authority relationship, there should be a presumption that the advice given by one professional should be respected by other professionals across the country, unless there are—again as set down in the Bill—emergency situations or other good reasons for an exception, particularly for local situations and so on. We do not want to undermine that relationship as a whole, as the new clause would do by removing the primary authority’s ability to intervene. In our scheme the primary authority’s right to direct that a particular action should not take place is only operative when the primary authority concludes that the enforcement action conflicts with advice.
The hon. Lady may remember that we had a discussion about the consistency of advice previously given to a business. The new clause would water down the provisions in the Bill by removing the primary authority’s right to intervene and the enforcing authority’s right to take the matter to arbitration through LBRO. That would give businesses less effective protection.
The hon. Lady also talked about who interprets the law. I understand that concerns remain among some in enforcement about the primary authority or LBRO effectively having jurisdiction over enforcement actions that a particular authority may wish to pursue. She also raised a concern on Tuesday that the scheme gives the primary authority and LBRO—I think she used the phrase a moment or two ago—de facto powers of legal interpretation, which are the proper function of the courts.
Let me make it clear that the new provisions will not undermine the courts, nor take over the legitimate role of legal interpretation. The idea behind the scheme is that, where a local authority has given advice to a business and a business has followed that advice in good faith, businesses should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be able to expect that they will not have serious action taken against them by another local authority. Neither LBRO nor the primary authority can give a once-and-for-all answer about the legality of a particular approach. Rightly, that decision must lie with the courts.
One of the issues on which LBRO, in determining whether consistency can be upheld, can take a view is on whether the advice or guidance from the primary authority was correct. LBRO will not be giving the opinion that there is only one correct piece of advice or guidance, but will be giving the opinion that the advice or guidance is not inconsistent with its understanding of the law as it stands at the time of arbitration. It will not therefore be usurping the role of the courts over legal interpretation. If it is not satisfied on those points, the enforcement action may go ahead and that might, in turn, mean that the matter could go to the courts. The main purpose of the primary authority scheme is to provide the consistency of enforcement to which I have referred. That is a change from existing practice, but it is important. The proposed scheme would not deliver the same, and would maintain the inconsistency that the Bill is attempting to answer.
People have raised issues about the primary authority scheme, but I hope that I have outlined how it is circumscribed. I also hope that I have clarified what it will do, and what it will not do. In the light of that, I hope that the hon. Lady does not press the new clause to a Division.

Lorely Burt: I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss the new clause because important issues needed to be expressed, as did the concerns of local authorities, in particular. I am grateful to the Minister for his comments and, on occasion, the reassurances that he has given. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

Compliance plan
‘(1) A primary authority may, after consultation with a regulated person, publish a compliance plan in respect of that person.
(2) A compliance plan under subsection (1) shall be a plan containing information regarding the regulated person.
(3) A compliance plan under subsection (1) may, in particular, set out information which may be of use to other local authorities, which may be enforcing authorities in respect of the regulated person, regarding that person’s operation including—
(a) processes and procedures employed by the regulated person to ensure compliance with legal requirements relating to relevant functions;
(b) planned improvements in that person’s premises or processes which affect compliance;
(c) planned employee training relating to compliance;
(d) external accreditation or audit relating to compliance;
(e) suggested priorities for inspections and other interventions; and
(f) other information of use to local authorities in carrying out their regulatory functions.
(4) LBRO may publish compliance plans and bring them to the notice of relevant local authorities.
(5) The primary authority may from time to time revise compliance plans following consultation with the regulated person.’.—[Lorely Burt.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Lorely Burt: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would broaden the scope of the suggested inspection plans to enable the primary authorities to publish a broad range of information about businesses that would be of benefit to other local authorities when exercising their functions. Furthermore, it would remove the bureaucracy associated with such plans by removing the requirements for written notifications and justifications if, for any reason, a local authority needs to carry out an inspection in response to local circumstances that fall outside the approach detailed in the published plan.
Clause 30 would have limited value in helping local authorities effectively co-ordinate and target their enforcement activities. It focuses only on planned inspections, which are only a small part of the regulatory work of regulators. The new clause allows for the publication of information that is far more useful to councils and enables regulated persons or entities to get information to all councils about safeguard systems and planned improvements. The clause would also fetter local authorities’ ability to respond at a local level to local issues, and it would add a level of bureaucracy that ultimately has no impact.
The new clause would still require a local authority to have regard to any published compliance plan, but it would remove the requirement for it to notify and justify to a primary authority why it acted in a way that did not fall within a published plan. It adds no value for a primary authority to stop another local authority acting outside the plan. A regulated person or entity has the right to complain via a local authority’s complaints procedure and, if necessary, via the independent local government ombudsman or judicial review if it considers that a local council has acted inappropriately.
If a primary authority can set out in the plan how often inspections should take place, I am concerned that the plan will lack the flexibility to deal with the very situation to which Lord Jones referred in another place. I cite the example of inspectors at the Tesco store at Olive avenue, Coventry, which is not a million miles away from my constituency. They undertook five inspections of the store, four of which were in response to customer complaints, and alleged that food was on sale past its use-by date. In total, 142 items of food were found available for sale past their use-by date. Despite alerting both branch managers and Tesco head office on each and every occasion, the failings within the store were not rectified. By the fourth visit, the situation was getting worse and officers discovered 73 items on sale past their use-by date, including 11 that were 10 days past it.
The point of the story is that Tesco began its submissions by apologising to the court for its failings and attempting to argue that its due diligence system was good, even though it accepted that it had not been correctly implemented this time. It argued that the failings were due to human error and placed the blame on the store manager. Clearly, the court decided otherwise, and Tesco was eventually fined £133,400 with £8,976 in costs. The point is that the local store failed to act on what was an acceptable company policy. In such cases, the primary authority could not be expected to know as well as the local authority which local stores were failing to comply with company policy. It could therefore set an inspection regime based on the assumption that a nationally agreed process was being implemented everywhere. As a result, a local authority might be prevented from undertaking inspections at a store that was not living up to national standards, and nothing would be done until an outbreak of food poisoning or, in a different type of environment, an accident.

Patrick McFadden: To some extent, my difficulty with this new clause is similar to my difficulty with the last one. The primary authority principle tries to give the regulator some sense of clarity and consistency about what to expect. The inspection plans set out in clause 30, which this new clause would replace, are part of doing that. Clause 30(3) gives examples of what could be in an inspection plan, mentioning
“the frequency at which, or circumstances in which, inspections should be carried out;”
and
“what an inspection should consist of”.
The list is not exhaustive and the Government expect inspection plans to include other information such as recommendations, enforcement and information on a wide range of issues relating to a business with which a primary authority has a partnership. The guide to the Bill, which I have referred to several times, includes some of those issues, suggesting details of improvements that a business is undertaking to improve its health and safety procedures, or details of ongoing problems relating to compliance that other local authorities should pay particular regard to. The issues in the new clause can be addressed in the inspection plan in clause 30. LBRO will take the issues raised into account when giving guidance to local authorities on implementing the inspection plans.
I have another point about the hon. Lady’s new clause. I am not sure that what she said was correct. She said that the new clause still required the enforcing authority to have regard to the plan—I am not sure that it does. It removes the key requirement for local authorities to have regard to a registered inspection plan when undertaking inspections and to notify the primary authority before departing from it. This is not only a replacement for the inspection plan; it puts a far lower level of onus on the enforcing authority to pay any heed to it. The Government expect that inspection plans will help to reduce unnecessary business inspections and facilitate knowledge sharing between primary and enforcing authorities. The compliance plan, as set out in the new clause, would not provide for that, because it would break the relationship whereby the enforcing authority has to have regard to the plan. Achieving those aims rests on ensuring that enforcing authorities have regard to an inspection plan and that they inform the primary authority of the reasons that they might depart from such a plan.
The hon. Lady talked about the need for flexibility, which is absolutely right. Of course we need flexibility in dealing with, for example, the problem of selling out-of-date food. That was a fair point. Inspection plans should always allow for the capacity to respond effectively to emergencies or, in particular, local circumstances, and plans will need LBRO sign-off to ensure that they are not unreasonable or totally inflexible. Through the primary authority principle, and the inspection plans in particular, we are trying to promote a relationship that offers consistency to those regulated, and a dialogue between local circumstances and the primary authority. I am afraid that, on those counts, her new clause would take us away from the aims of the Bill, so I hope that she will not press it to a vote.

Lorely Burt: I thank the Minister for his enlightening comments. I still feel that my proposal has many merits, particularly on information sharing and the spreading of best practice among local authorities. However, I take on board a number of his points, and I do not wish to press the new clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered,
That certain written evidence already reported to the House be appended to the proceedings of the Committee.—[Mr. McFadden.]

Question proposed, That the Chairman do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

Patrick McFadden: I thank the Committee for the way in which our business has been conducted over the past couple of days. In particular, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford for the questions that he put to me on clause 65—it was a welcome and enlightening intervention. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley, who serves on the Regulatory Reform Committee, for bringing her expertise to our deliberations. My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, North kept us in line in regard to Scottish law and gave us some legal advice, which I think in former life might have cost us a great deal more. Her help was extremely valuable. I resisted the attempts by my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud to divert us into a discussion on the merits or otherwise of two-tier and single-tier local government. I would like to thank all my other hon. Friends for their contributions.
I thank the hon. Member for Solihull, who has been labouring under extreme sickness—from the sound of her coughing—and I hope that she gets well soon. She moved a number of amendments, and raised a number of issues, that were also raised in another place. They are important issues, and we take them very seriously. Of course, I also thank the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford, who has probed and occasionally pressed with great skill and courtesy, for the way in which he has conducted the debate on the Bill and his amendments. I am conscious that there are a couple of points on which I have said that I will write to him, and I have not forgotten those.
Finally, of course, I wish to thank you, Mr. Chope, for your skilful, impartial and enlightening guidance in getting us through the Bill over the last couple of days. This is, as the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford said, an important Bill, if a technical one. In all the discussion of the individual clauses and amendments, we should not lose sight of the aims, which, as I have said, are to tackle the two problems of inconsistency and inflexibility in the current regulatory regime. If we manage to do that, we have done a significant service to the general public, to those who are regulated, and we will also have saved business in the country a significant sum of money—an estimated sum of up to £200 million—in regulatory costs. That is important because we want business to concentrate on the business of doing business, rather than the kind of costs that can hopefully be reduced by legislation such as this.

Mark Prisk: At the beginning of our deliberations I said that I would try to be precise in scrutiny and concise in my remarks, and although I have not been entirely perfect in those terms, I hope that I have not detained the Committee longer than was necessary. We have had some useful debates. We have seen at least eight concessions, or clarifications, from the Minister on the way that the law will work; they are crucial to those whom it will affect. He has just alluded to the fact that there will be two or three occasions when he needs to write to us as a Committee to set out the Government’s position. We fully understand, and it is important that that is on public record. When those concessions or clarifications are viewed in combination with the dozen or more important concessions acceded to in the other place, it can be seen that Parliament has undertaken its duty of proper, effective and focused scrutiny.
It falls to me to extend a few thanks. I should like to thank the Minister for his considered approach to my probing and pressing on various matters in Committee. I know that very often people outside this place assume that Prime Minister’s questions is the sole way that we can do our business, and although that is important—indeed, very important, but occasionally some Members get a little carried away, although obviously not on my side—what is important, nevertheless, is deliberations of the type that we have had. They have been measured and considered, and I thank the Minister for that.
I also extend my thanks to my hon. Friends, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Billericay, who has been a tremendous support, and other hon. Members who have made individual and particular contributions. Could I also, as the person who has been more than happy to table one or two amendments, thank the Clerks and Officers of the House, who are fantastic in the way in which they patiently take us through measures that are self-evidently nonsensical and turn them into something that has a semblance of order? I am very grateful to them for that.
Last but by no means least, indeed most importantly, I should like to thank you, Mr. Chope, for the light-touch and speedy way in which you have regulated our proceedings.

Lorely Burt: The Committee has been a shining example of how we can work together as a Committee, composed of Government and Opposition parties, in a concise and constructive way to examine clause by clause a Bill that had already greatly benefited from examination and amendment in another place. Our work was not unduly onerous, so I should like to convey my thanks, particularly to the Clerks, who have laboured with my strange and unusually phrased amendments, and have turned them into something acceptable. I thank the Minister for the helpful and constructive way in which he has dealt with the queries and amendments that I have raised. Finally, I thank you, Mr. Chope, for your wise guidance during the proceedings.

Christopher Chope: I have always been in favour of self-regulation, and what has happened during the proceedings of this Committee is an exemplary example of self-regulation. I am grateful to the Minister for his comments, and to the hon. Members for Hertford and Stortford and for Solihull for what they have had to say. I should like to echo their thanks to the Clerks of the House, to the police, to Hansard, the Badge Messengers and everybody who has enabled our proceedings to move so smoothly. The person who will probably be most thankful for all this is the hon. Member for Carlisle who will not be troubled as co-Chairman of the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Committee rose at twenty minutes to Three o’clock.